Hobbes. He denounces the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny, and adds that the pfinciples of *De Cive* and *leviathan* are pernicious both to piety and policy. Hobbes replied in 1656 in a substantial volume, *Questions Concerning Uberty$_y$ Necessity and Chance clearly stated and debated between Dr. l$ramhall> "Bishop of Deny and Thomas Hobbes.*

A gulf yawned between the disputants. The seventeenth century .was the golden age of Anglo-Catholic theology. Calvinism had lost favour in the Established Church, which emphasized its continuity with the Middle Ages, including the Catholic doctrines of free will. '* What do the Arminians hold ? " ran the current jest. "All the best preferments in England." The Puritans, on the other hand, carried on the Protestant tradition of justification by faith alone. Hobbes felt himself in good company. "All the famous doctors of the Reformed Church," he deckred," and with them St. Augustine, are of the same opinion.*' What the theologians argued on philosophical lines he attempted to prove by psychology.

The difference in method between the antagonists was as great as the differences in belief. Bramhall was trained in the scholasticism which Hobbes scorned as a game of meaningless terms, and Hobbes was dominated by the new scientific spirit of which the Bishop knew nothing. They agreed that men were free to do as they will, declared the preface, and both accepted the authority of scripture. " But one is a learned School divine, the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning."

Hobbes indicated his position in a sentence/ " The one (himself) holdeth that it is not in,a man's power now to choose the will he shall have anon; th&t chance produceth nothing;

that all -events and actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the necessity of all tilings." Science taught the great lesson of cause and effect, and he believed that scientific methods could and should be rigorously applied in every field. The doctrine of free will, as he understood it, meant the intrusion of an arbitrary element into human conduct, breaking the chain of causation, physical and psychological. Man is governed by passions, appetites, and aversions, which in their inferafction constitute his will. What we call choice is merely the result of our instinct to secure pleasure and avoid pain. The only real freedom of the will is the absence of external necessitation, that is of conditions which